-
Topics
Subnavigation
Topics
Electromagnetic fields
- What are electromagnetic fields?
- High-frequency fields
- Radiation protection in mobile communication
- Static and low-frequency fields
- Radiation protection relating to the expansion of the national grid
- Radiation protection in electromobility
- The Competence Centre for Electromagnetic Fields
Optical radiation
- What is optical radiation?
- UV radiation
- Visible light
- Infrared radiation
- Application in medicine and wellness
- Application in daily life and technology
Ionising radiation
- What is ionising radiation?
- Radioactivity in the environment
- Applications in medicine
- Applications in daily life and in technology
- Radioactive radiation sources in Germany
- Register high-level radioactive radiation sources
- Type approval procedure
- Items claiming to provide beneficial effects of radiation
- Cabin luggage security checks
- Radioactive materials in watches
- Ionisation smoke detectors (ISM)
- Radiation effects
- What are the effects of radiation?
- Effects of selected radioactive materials
- Consequences of a radiation accident
- Cancer and leukaemia
- Hereditary radiation damage
- Individual radiosensitivity
- Epidemiology of radiation-induced diseases
- Ionising radiation: positive effects?
- Radiation protection
- Nuclear accident management
- Service offers
-
The BfS
Subnavigation
The BfS
- Working at the BfS
- About us
- Science and research
- Laws and regulations
- Radiation Protection Act
- Ordinance on Protection against the Harmful Effects of Ionising Radiation
- Ordinance on Protection against the Harmful Effects of Non-ionising Radiation in Human Applications (NiSV)
- Frequently applied legal provisions
- Dose coefficients to calculate radiation exposure
- Links
Monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBT is one of the pivotal international treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996. Of the 44 so-called Annex 2 states that have to ratify the treaty before it enters into force, three countries are yet to sign and ratify the treaty. With the de-ratification of the treaty by Russia at the end of 2023, there are six countries today that have already signed, but are yet to ratify the treaty.
- The CTBTO monitors compliance with the treaty through seismic measurements, radioactivity measurements and special microphones in the oceans and the atmosphere. Several dozens of linked monitoring stations worldwide can detect minute traces of radioactivity in the air.
- The BfS participates in the verification by monitoring airborne radioactivity and operates the only station for highly sensitive radioactivity measurements in Central Europe on Mt Schauinsland near Freiburg.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is one of the central international treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although it has not yet entered into force, setting up and successfully operating a global network to monitor the test ban has started some 20 years ago.
- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty show less
- Monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty show more
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Number of nuclear weapons experiments worldwide until 2022
Start of nuclear weapons testing
With the "Trinity" test on 16 July 1945 in the USA, a nuclear weapon was detonated for the first time in human history. Only one month later, nuclear weapons were detonated during military operations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II.
Despite early considerations about international control of fissile material for the production of nuclear weapons, other nations acquired the ability to produce these weapons (Soviet Union: 1949, United Kingdom: 1952).
In the 1950s, the USA and the Soviet Union began testing so-called thermonuclear weapons (colloquially referred to as "hydrogen bombs"), which have a higher explosive yield and correspondingly produce larger amounts of radioactive fallout.
Partial Test Ban Treaty
The criticism following these tests led to an agreement between the USA, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to ban tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space in 1963.
This outcome was laid down in an international treaty, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty PTBT. France (first test in 1960) and China (first test in 1964), however, did not sign this treaty and conducted nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up until 1980.
From the partial to the comprehensive test ban
The International IMS measuring network
Source: CTBTO https://www.ctbto.org/map/
The states signatories to the PTBT complied with the rules of the treaty and consequently reduced the number of atmospheric (above-ground) tests and the associated radioactive fallout. However, the total number of nuclear weapons tests was not reduced, other than conducting them mostly below the Earth's surface. More than 2000 nuclear weapons tests have been counted to date.
After the PTBT had entered into force, a comprehensive test ban treaty was discussed at the diplomatic level and in 1976 the so-called "Group of Scientific Experts" (GSE) was established. Their task was to determine whether and how compliance with such a treaty could be verified. A reliable verification system is a crucial prerequisite for states to commit to a ban under international law. Initially, the experts' opinions on the possibilities and limits of scientific verification differed widely.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
It was the end of the Cold War before formal negotiations began at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Experts from the BfS had been substantially involved in the consultations, which were completed only two years later and the CTBT opened for signature in 1996.
The parties to the negotiations, however, wanted to ensure that signatories of the treaty did not enter into binding commitments until all states with nuclear installations - and consequently the capability to produce nuclear weapons - have joined. This is why the document contains a list of 44 states (so-called Annex 2 states) that have to ratify the treaty before it enters into force.
To this day, three out of these 44 states have yet to sign and ratify the treaty for it to enter into force (India, North Korea, Pakistan). With the de-ratification of the treaty by Russia in 2023, there are six countries today that have signed, but still have to ratify the treaty (Egypt, China, Iran, Israel, USA, Russia).
Implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Once the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has come into force, verification of the ban has to be instantly possible. For this reason, the so-called Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) with its task to set up an international monitoring network with 337 monitoring stations was established in Vienna. This monitoring network allows to reliably verify compliance with the treaty.
Other tasks of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) include to prepare concepts for on-site inspections (OSI), to develop measurement methods for on-site inspections and to conduct exercises.
Monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) monitors compliance with the treaty through seismic measurements, radioactivity measurements and special microphones in the oceans and the atmosphere.
The Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) participates in the verification by monitoring airborne radioactivity and supports the German Federal Foreign Office through technical evaluation and assessment of the data.
Monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
The international network of the CTBTO is designed to detect clandestine nuclear weapons tests worldwide. Several dozens of linked monitoring stations worldwide can detect minute traces of radioactivity in the air. The Federal Office for Radiation Protection operates the only station for highly sensitive radioactivity measurements in Central Europe on Mt Schauinsland near Freiburg.
Seismic measurements can give a first indication of an underground nuclear weapons test. The radioactive noble gases resulting from nuclear weapons test can leak into the atmosphere through the soil with a certain time lag. If this occurs, these gases can be detected by the highly sensitive radioactivity monitoring stations of the CTBTO and can clearly be attributed to a nuclear weapons test.
Global monitoring system
The CTBTO, with its headquarters in Vienna, is currently setting up a worldwide monitoring system with the help of the signatory states, consisting of a network of 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories. The network is able to detect, identify and also locate a nuclear explosion with high probability anywhere on Earth.
This system consists of
- 170 seismometers in the ground,
- 11 hydrophones in the oceans,
- 60 infrasound microphones in the atmosphere and
- 80 radionuclide monitoring stations for radioactivity in the air.
One of these radionuclide monitoring stations is Schauinsland Station of the BfS (Radionuclide Station RN33). The 80 radionuclide stations are supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories for quality assurance.
The importance of radioactivity measurements
The three geophysical techniques - seismology, infrasound and hydroacoustics - can quickly register and locate explosions with yields above 1 kiloton of trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent (unit of measurement for the energy released in an explosion). In a next step, the nuclear character of the explosion has to be unambiguously identified by the radionuclide monitoring technology.
When an explosive device detonates, a large number of fission products is produced. Most of the radionuclides formed this way do not occur in nature and also differ significantly in composition from the radioactivity released from nuclear power plants.
The area and the timing of the release can in addition be localised by atmospheric transport modelling.
What is measured?
At the 80 planned radionuclide stations integrated in the operational monitoring network, air is collected to identify traces of aerosol-bound gamma emitters. 40 of the 80 stations - including Schauinsland Station - additionally monitor the air for radioactive isotopes of the noble gas xenon (xenon-131m, xenon-133, xenon-133m and xenon-135).
Minimum requirements for technical equipment of the monitoring stations | ||
---|---|---|
Aerosols | Noble gases (radioactive xenon) | |
Measurement technology | High-purity germanium detector | High-purity germanium or beta-/gamma-coincidence detektor |
Air flow rates | at least 500 cubic metres per hour | at least 0.4 cubic metre per hour |
Limit of detection | 10 to 30 microbecquerels per cubic metre of air based on barium-140 | 1 millibecquerel per cubic metre of air based on xenon-133 |
Radioactive noble gases were included in the monitoring system as these can be released into the atmosphere by clandestine underground nuclear weapons tests and consequently increase the risk of detection for potential treaty violators. It is important that a distinction can be made through the isotope-specific measurements between radioactivity from civilian sources and radioactivity from possible nuclear weapons tests, which would constitute a treaty violation.
Data analysis
All measurement data are transmitted to the International Data Centre (IDC) of the CTBTO in Vienna through VPN or a satellite-based communication system. There they are analysed, distributed to the signatory states and archived.
State of 2024.07.31